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Abstract
Economists have recently begun trying to explain that pattern of Regional 
Trade Agreement (RTA) formation around the world. This paper adds to 
the developing literature by taking into account the fact that many of the 
RTAs signed are not effectively implemented. The analysis proceeds in 
two  steps:  the  gravity  model  is  used  to  establish  which  RTAs  are 
effectively implemented, in the sense that they positively and significantly 
increase trade flows between member countries compared to the flows 
predicted by the gravity model; second a hypothesis is tested about the 
pattern of effective RTAs – that successful RTAs are found between pairs 
of  countries  which send a large  share  of  their exports to  each  other’s 
markets.  Convincing  evidence  is  found  to  support  this  hypothesis, 
including evidence that export interest from one partner alone does not 
improve the probability of an effective RTA.
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Introduction & Literature Review
Since the start of the 1990s there has been a huge acceleration in the number of regional 
trade agreements (RTAs) signed between countries around the world (see Figure 1). This 
has prompted much discussion amongst economists about what has caused this sudden 
rush; how it will affect the chances of successful multilateral liberalisation; and whether 
or not these agreements will be welfare improving. Some contributors to the debate, such 
as Jagdish Bhagwati, have emphasised the danger that regional blocks will constitute 
stumbling blocks to the global liberalisation process, and cause large amounts of trade 
diversion.
1 However others, such as Sherman Robinson, argue that the empirical evidence 
supports the view that regional trade agreements have been net trade-creating and world 
welfare improving.
2 With the current lack of progress at the World Trade Organisation 
(WTO) this continues to be a hugely important and controversial topic, and much effort is 
being made to get a better understanding of the forces underlying regionalism.
In this dissertation I contribute to the ongoing debate by looking behind the pattern of 
regional trade agreement formation. I carry out a comprehensive survey of the impact of 
existing agreements between their members, and then explore the reasons behind the 
trading relationships that have emerged. This involved constructing an entirely new data 
set including country and trade data for most of the world’s countries, as well as separate 
series capturing the formation of each of 158 regional trade agreements. Using this data 
the impact of all existing RTAs was completely re-examined in order to generate a binary 
series indicating, for any country pair, whether an agreement with a significant positive 
impact on trade flows between members was in force. Finally these results were used, in 
one of the first studies of this kind, to test certain political economy hypotheses about the 
motivations of the countries that enter into effective trade agreements.
                                                
1 Bhagwati (1993)
2 Robinson et al (2003)4

































Source: WTO and TUCK Trade Agreements Database
In general Article 1 of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1947 (GATT) forbids 
any  preferential  trading  arrangements  (the  ‘Most  Favoured  Nation’  principle).  An 
exception to this is that Regional Trade Agreements are permitted, so long as they take 
the form of customs unions or free trade areas satisfying the conditions of Article 24, 
essentially that ‘substantially all trade’ is fully liberalised, and that there is no overall 
increase in external protection. There are also further exceptions for developing countries 
under the Generalised System of Preferences (GSP) and the ‘enabling clause’.
Understanding  the  emerging  pattern  of  functioning  RTAs  is  crucial  to  understanding 
what the effects of these RTAs are likely to be. It will help to distinguish between the 
prediction that RTAs will lead to regional blocs of free trade between natural trading 
partners, and  the  suggestion  put  forward by Baldwin  (2003)  that  RTAs  are likely  to 
emerge in a hub-spoke formation, where the spokes tend to be marginalised in terms of 
trade and investment. In order to get a clear picture of how RTAs affect trade flows, it is 
important to distinguish between those RTAs which have been signed, and those that are 
signed and actually make a difference to trade.5
While the discussion of the effects of RTAs  is well developed, there  have been  few 
attempts  to  model  and test the reasons behind RTA  formation. Baier and  Bergstrand 
(2003) were among the first to address this issue. They used a general equilibrium model 
of  world  trade  to  make  predictions  about  which  country  pairs  would  enhance  their 
welfare most by forming trade agreements, with the hypothesis that these countries would 
be  more  likely  than  others  to  do  so.  This  prediction  was  then  tested  by  identifying 
particular characteristics which should make an agreement more likely and using them as 
explanatory variables. The variables included in the model were: NATURAL, a measure 
of pair closeness; REMOTE, a measure of pair remoteness from the rest of the world; 
RGDP, real GDP; DRGDP, difference in real GDP; DKL, the difference in capital to 
labour ratio; SQDKL, difference in capital/labour ratio squared; and DROWKL, which 
picked up the difference in capital to labour ratio of the countries to the rest of the world. 
These were used as explanatory variables in a probit model where the dependent variable 
was a binary indicator of whether a country pair had an agreement covering bilateral 
trade flows. They found that their model was able to explain around 85% of free trade 
agreements.  All  of  the  variables  included  were  found  to  be  significant  and  had  the 
expected signs. The dependent variable covered RTAs signed by 1996  that had been 
notified to the WTO by 2002 (no partial RTAs were included).
Magee (2004) provides one of the first attempts to model RTA formation on the basis of 
political  economy  factors.  His  results  show  that  countries  are  more  likely  to  form 
agreements if they are already major trading partners, if they are similar in size, and if 
they are both democracies. These results are then used endogenise the RTA variable in a 
gravity model, in order to get a better measure of the effect of preferential agreements on 
trade volumes. This is an attempt to deal with the problem noted by several other authors, 
for  example  Winters  and  Soloaga  (2001),  that  RTAs  are  more  likely  to  be  formed 
between countries that already have a close trading relationship. A ‘naive’ application of 
the gravity model, which does not take into account the existing trading relationships of 
countries, therefore leads an RTA dummy to pick up existing pair-specific ties between 
countries, and not only the effect of the RTA itself, biasing the coefficient upwards.
This paper seeks to add to the developing literature by: 1) taking into account the fact that 
many  RTAs  that  are  signed  do  not  impact  on  trade  flows;  and  2)  testing  for  the 
importance of ‘mercantilism’ in driving the formation of those RTAs which are effective.6
Up to now explanations of the pattern of RTAs have not tried to distinguish between 
those RTAs which affect trade flows between member countries and those that do not. 
Even after an RTA has been signed it will face significant costs, and perhaps opposition, 
to its implementation. Only if the interest in bilateral liberalisation in each country is 
strong enough is an RTA likely to be fully and effectively implemented. Otherwise it 
may not be implemented at all, or it may be implemented in such a way that it is unlikely 
to have any effects.
One example of a case where an agreement might be signed but not implemented in an 
effective way would be cases in which a free trade agreement includes burdensome rules 
of origin regulations that reduce take-up percentages for preferential trade. Members of a 
customs union agree to  set a common external tariff, but members of other types  of 
agreement (which represent the vast majority of those signed) rely on rules of origin to 
prevent external goods entering their markets via other member countries with lower 
external tariffs. Usually this involves some sort of minimum proportion of a good which 
must be produced within a free trade area in order to qualify for preferential treatment.
This paper will focus on political economy explanations of effective RTA formation. In 
particular,  it  will  test  the  hypothesis  that  an  important  driving  force  behind  the 
implementation of effective RTAs is mercantilism, in other words the desire for access to 
export markets. The analysis proceeds in two stages. First a gravity model is used to 
determine which RTAs that have been signed have had a positive and significant effect 
on trade flows between member countries. The results from this stage are then used to 
generate a binary series capturing whether or not a particular country pair has an effective 
bilateral RTA. This series (called realRTA) will take the value 1 wherever an ‘effective’ 
RTA exists between two countries and 0 otherwise. In the second part of the analysis the 
hypothesis that the formation of these effective RTAs is driven, at least in part, by the 
export interests of the countries concerned is tested.
The  rest  of  the  paper  is  divided  into  four  sections.  The  first  of  these  discusses  the 
theoretical background for this research, including the theory behind the gravity model, 
and a discussion of previous attempts to model RTA formation. The next section goes on 
to discuss issues associated with the econometric estimations, including how the data set 
was constructed and how each stage of the analysis was carried out. The results of each 
stage are then presented, with a short discussion of how they can be interpreted. The final 
section concludes the paper.7
Theory
The Gravity Model
The standard tool used to measure the impact of RTAs or other liberalisation policies on 
trade flows is the gravity model. The gravity model is adapted from Newton’s Law of 
Gravity, and in essence states that the attraction of goods between countries depends 
positively on their economic masses, and negatively on the distance between them. The 
original model has been refined since its early applications, in order to take into account 
theoretical justifications for its use. The gravity equation adopted in this paper is shown 
below (a simple theoretical derivation for the model is provided in Appendix 1):
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Vod,t= total value of trade from country of origin (country o) to destination country 
(country d) at time t
τod,t= variable capturing the bilateral trade costs between the countries o and d
σ = elasticity of substitution between all varieties.
Ωo,t = variable capturing the openness of the world to country o’s goods at time t
Δd,t = variable capturing the openness of the destination country to the world’s goods at 
time t
Eo,t= Expenditure of country o at time t
Ed,t= Expenditure of country d at time t
The aim of this application of the gravity model is to determine the effectiveness of a 
number of RTAs. The existence of an RTA should reduce bilateral trade costs, and result 
in a reduction in τ. The econometric methodology is discussed in a later section.8
Models of Regional Trade Agreement Formation
There have been a few attempts to model RTA formation in the literature. Grossman and 
Helpman (1995) model the formation of RTAs in two separate stages. First there is a 
process  of  competition  between  different  political  forces  within  a  state,  whereby  the 
government’s policy preferences are determined. It is assumed that governments place 
some weight on the welfare of the average voter, but are also swayed by pressure from 
political interest groups. This results in two types of situations where a government might 
favour an RTA: those where an agreement would generate substantial welfare gains for 
voters and adversely affected interest groups fail to exert offsetting pressure; and those 
where liberalisation would result in profits for exporters which outweigh the losses in 
import-competing industries plus the political cost of any harm to voters. In a second 
stage states’ governments interact internationally (in the context of bilateral negotiations) 
and an agreement is signed if both governments are in favour. The model predicts that 
this outcome is most likely where there is a relative balance in the potential trade between 
the partners and when the agreement affords enhanced protection, rather than reduced 
protection to most sectors (with enhanced protection an exporting industry captures the 
benefits of high domestic prices in the partner country). Since enhanced protection is 
associated  with  trade  diversion,  this  means  that  RTAs  would  be  more  likely  in 
circumstances where they reduced aggregate social welfare.
An alternative vision of regionalism can be found in Baldwin’s work, where the idea is 
put  forward  that  RTA  formation  is  driven  by  the  export  interests  of  the  countries 
involved. Baldwin (1993, 1997) describes a process of regional integration driven by the 
reluctance of countries to be left out of expanding free trade areas. This is formalised in a 
footloose capital model, which shows that the welfare benefits of entering a free trade 
area increase as the size of the markets covered by existing agreements increases. A 
‘domino  effect’  follows,  whereby  a  single  agreement  between  two  countries  could 
provoke  a  rash  of  other  RTAs.  Baldwin  asserts  that  this  is  likely  to  result  in  a 
‘Juggernaut’ effect, in other words an increasing and unstoppable trend towards further 
liberalisation.  However,  the  size  of  the  partner’s  export  market  is  an  important 
determinant of RTA formation, and agreements are more likely to be made with regional 
‘hubs’ (which represent important export markets for all surrounding countries), and hub-
spoke-systems  may  emerge,  in  which  the  smaller  ‘spoke’  countries  do  not  enter 
agreements  with  one  another.  These  countries  may  then  suffer  as  trade  is  diverted 9
towards hub countries (spokes will also eventually become less desirable locations for 
investment)  resulting  in  a  welfare  outcome  which  compares  unfavourably  with  the 
outcome of a free trade area where all countries in a region liberalise indiscriminately 
with one another.
In a later paper Baldwin (2003) develops an empirical measure which determines the 
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M
od is the share of nation o’s goods that are sold in nation d’s market and vice 
versa for s
X
od. This measure is based on the assumption that the interest of countries in 
forming RTAs with partners is primarily due to the desire to get access to export markets.
Following  the  general  ideas  outlined  by  Baldwin,  I  adopt  the  hypothesis  that  RTA 
formation is driven by the export interests of the countries involved, but the analysis is 
simplified somewhat for the purposes of this paper. I assume that governments will want 
to implement an RTA with a trade partner if there is enough domestic political support 
for bilateral liberalisation. More specifically an RTA will be implemented between two 
countries if the export interest of both countries is strong enough with the other.
A variable ‘Mij’ is defined to represent the power of mercantilist interest in country i with 
respect  to  access  to  market  j.  An  agreement  will  be  effectively  implemented  if  this 
interest is strong enough in both country i and country j. In other words mercantilist 
interest,  M,  must  be  above  some  critical  value  (M*)  in  both  countries.  If  the  binary 
variable realRTA
3 captures cases where an effective RTA is implemented then:
realRTAij  = 1 IF Mij>M* and Mji>M*
                                                
3 This variable will be determined by the econometric results from the first stage and will take the value 1 
when the results of the gravity model suggest that bilateral trade flows between members are positively and 
significantly affected by the entry into force of the RTA, and 0 otherwise.10
It is recognised that other historical, geographical and political factors will also facilitate 
the implementation of RTAs. In the econometric work some attempt will be made to 
proxy for these factors, but the main aim of this research will be to test the specific 
hypothesis that interest in export market access drives the implementation of effective 
RTAs, rather than to create a comprehensive model with maximum explanatory power.
Support for certain aspects of the domino theory is also explored in the econometrics 
section.11
Data & Econometric Issues
Data
In order to carry out the gravity model analysis it was necessary to build a large data set 
incorporating  trade,  GDP  (nominal),  and  other  country  data  over  as  many  years  as 
possible. Bilateral trade data
4 from the UN COMTRADE database was extracted through 
World Integrated Trading Solution  (WITS) and data on GDP was extracted from the 
World  Bank  Development  Indicators  (WDI)  database.  In  addition,  other  descriptive 
country data was downloaded from the website of the Centre D’Etudes Prospectives et 
D’Informations  Internationales  (CEPII).
5  This  data  was  combined  using  the  Access 
database programme to create an unbalanced panel data set covering 42 years (1962 to 
2004)  and  178  countries.  The  panel  used  in  the  estimations  contained  148,802 
observations.
6  The  results  from  this  data  set  were  supplemented  using  earlier  results 
obtained using an existing data set made available by Andrew Rose.
7 This was useful 
since this other panel continued back as far as 1948, thus covering the dates of entry of 
some of the earlier agreements. For the main analysis the new data was preferred since it 
contained five years of more recent data and avoids certain problems with the Rose data 
                                                
4 For  trade  flows reported  imports  rather  than  exports  were  used  to  compile  the  data,  since  these  are 
generally regarded to be reported more reliably.
5 www.cepii.com
6 This panel used average trade flows between countries as the dependent variable, rather than including 
flows in each direction as separate observations. Another data set in which flows were not averaged was 
also created, however this data set contained 427,318 separate observations and proved too large to handle 
using the computing facilities available.
7 http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/arose/12
set such as the use of real GDP instead of nominal, and the use of the log of average trade 
flows rather than the average of the logged trade flows as the dependent variable.
8
The first part of the analysis generates the data for the dependent variable in the second 
stage (the binary ‘effective RTA’ series called realRTA). In addition export data from the 
UN  COMTRADE  database  was  extracted  through  WITS  (World  Integrated  Trading 
Solution)  and  country  pair  variables  were  added  from  CEPII,  including  distance, 
contiguity, common language, continent etc. The second data set is cross-section data for 
2002 and covers 131 countries (5,426 observations). The year 2002 was chosen in place 
of the most recent year for which data was available because of the difficulty of assessing 
the effectiveness of RTAs brought into force since that date based on only a few years of 
data.
9
Estimation Part I: The Gravity Model
Specification
The first part of the analysis is based on the gravity model described above. Taking logs 
one obtains:
) ln( ) ln( ) ln( ) 1 ( ) ln( ) ln( ) ln( , , , , , , t d t o t od t d t o t od E E V          
However, for the purposes of these estimations it was assumed that bilateral trade barriers 
were symmetrical, allowing the average of the flows to be used, rather than including a 
separate  observation  for  exports  in  each  direction.  Following  the  literature,  the 
populations of the countries were also included as a further measure of the economic size 
of a country.
                                                
8 See Baldwin (2005) for a full discussion of the problems with the Rose data set and their implications for 
gravity model estimations.
9 It transpired that only one RTA implemented since 2002 was judged to be effective, and this was left out 
of the realRTA series as it came into force in July 2003.13
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Where:
Xod,t = average value of real bilateral trade between o and d at time t
Yo,t = real GDP of country o at time t
popo,t = population in country o at time t
In the final estimation any non-time varying pair-specific variables are subsumed into the 
country-pair fixed effects. A separate time-dummy was also included for each year, so 
that the form of the final estimated equation was:
                t RTA pop pop Y Y X t t d t o t d t o od t od ) (ln ) (ln ) ( ) ln( ) ln( , 5 , 4 , 3 , 2 , 0 ,
Where:
RTAt = matrix of RTA dummies (including 158 separate series).
t = matrix of time dummies including separate dummy for each year 1963-2004
The RTA Variables
The matrix of RTA dummies was generated using information on agreements notified to 
the WTO
10 and contained in the Tuck Trade Agreements Database.
11 For each of the 158 
RTAs  that  had  entered  into  force  by  2003  a  separate  series  was  generated  using 
STATA,
12  taking  the  value  1  when  countries  o  and  d  had  signed  an  RTA  covering 
bilateral trade at time t and 0 otherwise. For multi-country agreements such as the EU a 
                                                
10 http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/region_e/region_e.htm
11 http://cibresearch.tuck.dartmouth.edu/trade_agreements_db/index.php
12 This approach seems to be fairly new. Most studies either use a single RTA dummy (implicitly assuming 
that all RTAs lead to an identical shift in the intercept), or introduce separate dummies, but for a limited 
selection of RTAs, e.g. Magee (2004).14
single variable was created to capture the effect of the EU on all member countries. A 
separate dummy was generated for each bilateral agreement between a customs union and 
a non-member country. This series took the value 1 between (for example) the non-EU 
country and each individual EU member.
Each RTA dummy takes the value 1 from the date of entry into force of the RTA. Every 
attempt was made to ensure that where an RTA was dissolved (for example as countries 
left  EFTA  to  join  the  EU)  the  dummy  returned  to  0.  However  information  on  the 
termination of RTAs was not very readily available and it is possible that there are some 
errors in the data with respect to this issue.
There  were  several  cases  where  inclusion  of  the  RTA  dummy  introduced  perfect 
multicollinearity with the pair fixed effects. This was the case for country pairs where 
there was no data on trade flows outside the period when the RTA was in force. Most of 
these RTAs involved countries in the former Soviet Union, and in such cases the RTAs 
were dropped during the estimation process.
Use of Country-Pair Fixed Effects
In some studies,  for  example  Rose  (2003)  an  attempt  is  made  to  model  Δ,  Ω  and τ
explicitly, by introducing includes a plethora of dummy variables capturing cases where 
countries have a common language, a shared border etc. I opted instead to use country-
pair fixed effects. The first reason for this was that it seemed much easier to use fixed 
effects than to include every conceivable variable that might affect relative trade costs. In 
particular, it is difficult to find data on Δ and Ω, which capture what has become known 
as ‘multilateral resistance’. Since most of the variables included in the Rose estimations 
are not time-varying, for example distance or contiguity, their impact is subsumed into 
the country-pair fixed effects.
The form of the theoretically grounded gravity model suggests that it is very important to 
account  not  just  for  bilateral  trade  costs,  but  bilateral  costs  relative  to  multilateral 
resistance. The intuition behind this is that the effects of factors such as distance between 
countries will depend not only on bilateral distance, but also on distance from the rest of 
the world. The classic example is Australia and New Zealand. Although these countries 
are  geographically  very  far  away  from  each  other  their  distance  from  any  other 
industrialised nation means that they trade disproportionately with each other compared, 
for example, to European countries that are much closer together.15
Some studies account for these issues by using country fixed effects (for partner and 
reporter separately). This allows the use of fixed effects which vary in each time period, 
which  would  not  be  possible  using  country-pair  fixed  effects  since  the  degrees  of 
freedom would be reduced to zero (at least when using averaged bilateral data). However 
this approach does not capture all of the pair-specific factors which affect relative trade 
costs. This point alludes to the second major reason why country-pair fixed effects are 
important in this particular study. Soloaga and Winters (2001) and Magee (2004) point 
out that the effect of an RTA is difficult to capture accurately in the gravity model due to 
endogeneity. In other words RTAs are more likely to be formed between country pairs 
that already have unusually large bilateral trade flows. If this effect is not controlled for 
then the estimated coefficient on an RTA dummy is likely to be biased upwards. 
In order to obtain a less biased estimate of the effect of an RTA on trade it is necessary to 
introduce  other  variables  to  capture  the  existing  bilateral  relationship  between  trade 
partners. Country specific fixed effects will not do this but country-pair fixed effects will. 
The validity of this approach rests on the assumption that bilateral fixed effects (or rather 
the factors driving the coefficients on them) do not vary too much over time. Trading 
relationships between countries are slow to evolve, but it is unrealistic to think that they 
have not changed at all for any country pairs over the last 42 years. In cases where the 
fixed effects would have been negative in 1962 but positive in 2004 the introduction of 
an RTA dummy some way through the period is likely to pick up this change in the 
relationship.
This problem will be dealt with in this paper by reducing the number of years used in the 
data set when measuring the impact of the agreements. The agreements will be divided 
into groups which entered into force within a particular five year period, and for each of 
these an estimation will be carried out using data beginning about seven years before the 
first agreement came into force and ending about seven years after the last (covering 
roughly 20 years in total). This is judged to provide a sufficient run-up period prior to the 
first  agreement  coming  into  force,  bearing  in  mind  the  possibility  that  trade  could 
increase slightly earlier due to an anticipation effect. Similarly there is sufficient time 
after the last agreement in the group comes into force to judge its effectiveness even if 16
there were some delay in the impact. By reducing the time period covered in the data the 
effects of the RTAs are isolated as far as possible from other earlier or later changes in a 
trading relationship.
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Estimation Part II: Reasons for Effective RTA Formation
Specification
The dependent variable in this second part of analysis is ‘realRTA’. This series takes the 
value 1 between countries whose bilateral trade is covered by an RTA that was found to 
have a positive and significant effect on trade flows between members in the gravity 
estimation, and zero otherwise. The estimation was carried out using the logit model.
In  general,  the  prediction  to  be  tested  is  that  the  probability  of  realRTA  formation 
depends on the mercantile interest of the two countries in a trading relationship, along 
with other factors:
) , , ( ) 1 ( 21 12 other M M f realRTA P  
The variable ‘M’, defined in the theory section, is not observable. Nor is the critical value 
‘M*’ required in both countries for RTA formation. To proxy for the impact of M another 
variable is introduced:
sij = share of exports to country j in total exports of country i
sij captures the fact that the interest in country i for implementing an effective RTA with
country j depends on what share of i’s exports already go to country j. If country j is a 
very important export partner then the export interest in bilateral liberalisation will be 
greater since exporters will improve their terms of trade on a large volume of goods, and 
there is also likely to be an important trade creation effect. Therefore Mij is increasing in 
sij.
                                                
13  Unfortunately  it  is  very  difficult  in  this  type  of  study  to  completely  isolate  the  effects  of  a  trade 
agreement from those of other contemporaneous changes in a trading relationship.17
One prediction of the theory is that an agreement will only be effectively implemented if 
mercantilist  interest  is  sufficient in  both  countries.  If this  is  true,  then it  will  be  the 
minimum of the export shares in each direction which will be the key determinant of a 
successful RTA, rather than both shares. In order to test this element of the hypothesis, 
the following variables are introduced:
mins = sij IF sij < sji and sji otherwise
maxs = sij IF sij > sji and sji otherwise
After introducing these variables one would expect to see that the variable mins has a 
positive and significant effect on the probability of successful RTA formation, but that 
maxs should not have a significant effect on the probability of a ‘realRTA’.
The variable sij is used as a proxy for Mij, but no attempt is made to identify a critical 
value of s which would correspond to M*, the threshold value above which a country has 
an incentive to see that an RTA becomes effective. The min and max s values are used 
instead  (if  mins  were over  the  threshold  then  the level  of  maxs  would  be  irrelevant, 
similarly if it were below the threshold then maxs would again have no effect). It also 
seems more sensible not to assume that ‘s’ behaves in precisely the same way as ‘M’, or 
that other omitted factors do not cloud the simple relationship outlined in the theory 
section.
Following the similar literature on currency union formation
14 other variables are also 
included in order to proxy for omitted factors which would facilitate the implementation 
of RTAs: 
DIST: Distance between the two most important cities in the two countries. It is assumed 
that countries which are far away from each other will be less likely to make effective 
agreements. Opportunities to meet and carry out political negotiations are likely to be 
more difficult the further two countries are away from each other. (Expected sign of 
coefficient - negative)
                                                
14 Tenreyro et al (2003), Persson (2001). 18
CONTIG: Dummy variable taking value 1 for contiguous countries. One would expect 
contiguous countries to be more likely to form effective agreements. This similar to the 
reasoning for countries which have smaller distances between them, but will capture any 
specific effects associated with a shared land border. (Expected sign – positive)
COMLANG_OFF: Dummy variable taking value 1 if countries share common official 
language.  A  common  official  language  would  be  expected  facilitate  negotiations  and 
strengthen political ties. (Expected sign – positive)
COLONY: Dummy variable taking value 1 if the countries have ever had a colonial link. 
A former colonial relationship may mean lasting ties and a closer political relationship 
between two countries. (Expected sign – positive)
COMCOL: Dummy taking value 1 if the two countries have shared a common coloniser 
in the period since 1945. Again, countries which have shared a colonial ruler could have 
lasting political links or relationships which might facilitate the formation of successful 
RTAs. (Expected sign – positive).
In a further estimation, dummy variables which take the value 1 when both partners are 
on the same continent will be added to the specification. Separate dummies are included 
for each of five continents (Africa, America, Asia, Europe and Pacific
15). If the domino 
theory outlined in Baldwin (1993) is true, then we would expect to see that on certain 
continents RTA formation has ‘taken off’, whereas on others it has not. Evidence for this 
would  be  positive  and  significant  coefficients  for  some  continents,  and  negative  or 
insignificant coefficients for others.
Specifications estimated:
(1)
     
  
     
   
COMCOL COLONY OFF COMLANG CONTIG DIST
s s realRTA P
7 6 5 4 3
21 2 12 1 0
_
) 1 (
                                                
15 Continent categories are taken from the CEPII geographical information dataset.19
(2)
     
  
     
   
COMCOL COLONY OFF COMLANG CONTIG DIST
s s realRTA P
7 6 5 4 3
2 1 0
_
max min ) 1 (
(3)
COMCOL COLONY OFF COMLANG CONTIG DIST
s s realRTA P
7 6 5 4 3
2 1 0
_
max min ) 1 (
    
  
    
   
            h PACIFICbot EUROPEboth ASIAboth h AMERICAbot AFRICAboth 12 11 10 9 8
Endogeneity
By definition, countries which have an effective RTA in operation between them have 
seen in increase in trade with each other at some point in their recent past. Therefore the 
share of trade to each other’s markets is not completely exogenous. This endogeneity 
problem is likely to bias the coefficient on trade shares upwards in my estimations and 
the result should be treated with some caution. However one mitigating effect may be 
that countries which have signed at least one effective agreement may be more likely to 
sign agreements with other countries (domino effect) or to liberalise more generally than 
other countries. In this case, although we know from the gravity model results that the 
volume of trade between members of an agreement has risen, the share in each other’s 
exports  may  not  have.
16  It  is  quite  difficult  to  get  round  the  problem  of  two-way 
causation, but it is important to realise that there is a real difference between the share of 
a partner in a countries exports, and the marginal impact of a trading agreement (in other 
words this exercise does not amount to attempting to estimate an identity).
                                                
16  One  way  round  this  problem  would  be  to  use  export  share  data  from  immediately  before  the 
implementation of any agreement to calculate s, but this would vary by agreement, and the year to use for 
countries not in any agreement would not be obvious.20
Results
Results Part I: Identifying Effective RTAs
The gravity model outlined above was run first with pooled data then country pair and 
year fixed effects were added. In each case robust standard errors are reported
17 and the 
full results are given in Appendix 3. In both cases the coefficients on the logs of the 
GDPs are positive and close to unity, in line with the theory. The coefficients on log of 
population are also positive and significant in both cases; consistent with the idea that 
population is a further measure of economic mass. However there is a big change in the 
coefficients  on  population  once  country  pair  fixed  effects  and  year  dummies  are 
introduced. A possible explanation for this is that much of the variation in population is 
cross-sectional, and once the fixed effects are introduced some of this is absorbed.
18
The next step of the estimation process was to run the model on shorter time periods, and 
test smaller groups of RTAs that were brought into effect over the same five-year period. 
The results of these regressions are given in Appendix 4. In these estimates there is some 
variation in the coefficients on the gravity variables. The regression period has now been 
reduced  to  15-20  years  of  data,  and  less  of  the  variation  in  GDP  and  population  is 
therefore likely to be attributed to changes over time, and even more to cross-sectional 
variation.  This  probably  accounts  for  the  strange  GDP  and  Population  coefficients. 
However, since the aim of this study is not to get a better overall understanding of how to 
model  trade  flows,  but  to  isolate  the  effects  of  RTAs,  the  coefficients  on  the  RTA 
dummies are considered reliable enough to generate the realRTA series which will be 
used in the next stage.
                                                
17 Graphical evidence of heteroskedasticity can be seen in Appendix 5 where the residuals are plotted.
18 This suggests that some care should be taken in interpreting the coefficients of the gravity variables once 
fixed  effects  have  been  introduced  (a  suggestion  that  will  become  even  more  apparent  in  the  later 
estimations), but since these are not the focus of the research, and the interpretation of the coefficients of 
the RTA variables should not be affected, this problem is not considered to be too important.21
Out of 122 RTAs tested, 55 proved to have positive and significant coefficients (at the 
5%  level).  In  other  words  more  than  half  of  the  agreements  induced  no  measurable 
increase in trade flows between member countries. The 5% level was used as a cut-off, 
but the vast majority (45) of the effective agreements were significant at the 1% level, 
and only four agreements fell in the 2-5% significance band. The measured marginal 
effects range from 10% to a somewhat incredible 4.85 for the Latvia-Slovenia agreement, 
but most are below 100%. A full list of the ‘effective’ agreements is provided here:
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Table 1: Full List of Effective Regional Trade Agreements
Common Name Type of Agreement
Entered into 
Force
EC (Treaty of Rome) Customs Union Primary Agreement 01-Jan-58
EFTA (Stockholm Convention)
Regional/Plurilateral Free Trade 
Agreement 03-May-60
CACM Customs union 12-Oct-61
EC – Malta Association Free Trade Agreement 01-Apr-71
PTN Preferential arrangement 11-Feb-73
Bangkok Agreement Preferential Arrangement 17-Jun-76
EC – Egypt Association Free Trade Agreement 01-Jun-77
CER Free trade agreement 01-Jan-83
CAN Preferential arrangement 25-May-88
GSTP Preferential arrangement 19-Apr-89
MERCOSUR Customs Union Primary Agreement 29-Nov-91
EC - Czech Republic  Association Free Trade Agreement 01-Mar-92
EC – Hungary Association Free Trade Agreement 01-Mar-92
EC – Poland Association Free Trade Agreement 01-Mar-92
EC – Slovakia Association Free Trade Agreement 01-Mar-92
EFTA – Turkey Association Free Trade Agreement 01-Apr-92
CEFTA Free trade agreement 01-Mar-93
EFTA - Romania  Association Free Trade Agreement 01-May-93
EC – Romania Association Free Trade Agreement 01-Jun-93
EFTA – Bulgaria Association Free Trade Agreement 01-Jul-93
EFTA – Hungary Association Free Trade Agreement 01-Oct-93
EFTA – Poland Association Free Trade Agreement 15-Nov-93
EC – Bulgaria Association Free Trade Agreement 31-Dec-93
North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA)
Regional/Plurilateral Free Trade 
Agreement 01-Jan-94
EC – Latvia Association Free Trade Agreement 01-Jan-95
EC – Lithuania Association Free Trade Agreement 01-Jan-95
                                                
19 See Appendix 2 for a guide to RTA acronyms22
Common Name Type of Agreement
Entered into 
Force
Mexico - Colombia – Venezuela
Regional/Plurilateral Free Trade 
Agreement 01-Jan-95
Mexico - Costa Rica Bilateral Free Trade Agreement 01-Jan-95
Moldova - Romania  Bilateral Free Trade Agreement 01-Jan-95
EFTA – Slovenia Association Free Trade Agreement 01-Jul-95
EC – Turkey Customs Union Primary Agreement 01-Jan-96
EFTA – Estonia Association Free Trade Agreement 01-Jun-96
EFTA - Latvia  Association Free Trade Agreement 01-Jun-96
EFTA – Lithuania Association Free Trade Agreement 01-Aug-96
Latvia – Slovenia Bilateral Free Trade Agreement 01-Aug-96
Estonia - Slovenia  Bilateral Free Trade Agreement 01-Jan-97
EC – Slovenia Association Free Trade Agreement 01-Jan-97
Lithuania – Poland Bilateral Free Trade Agreement 01-Jan-97
Lithuania – Slovenia Bilateral Free Trade Agreement 01-Mar-97
Israel – Turkey Bilateral Free Trade Agreement 01-May-97
Latvia - Slovakia  Bilateral Free Trade Agreement 01-Jul-97
Canada — Chile Bilateral Free trade agreement 05-Jul-97
Estonia – Hungary Bilateral Free Trade Agreement 01-Jan-98
Romania – Turkey Bilateral Free Trade Agreement 01-Feb-98
Lithuania - Turkey  Bilateral Free Trade Agreement 01-Mar-98
Hungary – Turkey Bilateral Free Trade Agreement 01-Apr-98
Slovakia – Turkey  Bilateral Free Trade Agreement 01-Sep-98
Bulgaria — Turkey Bilateral Free trade agreement 01-Jan-99
Latvia – Poland Bilateral Free Trade Agreement 01-Jun-99
Chile — Mexico Bilateral Free trade agreement 01-Aug-99
EC - South Africa Association Free Trade Agreement 01-Jan-00
Hungary – Latvia Bilateral Free Trade Agreement 01-Jan-00
Poland – Turkey Bilateral Free Trade Agreement 01-May-00
Slovenia – Turkey  Bilateral Free Trade Agreement 01-Jun-00
EC – Mexico Association Free Trade Agreement 01-Jul-00
Mexico – Israel Bilateral Free Trade Agreement 01-Jul-00
India - Sri Lanka Bilateral Free Trade Agreement 15-Dec-01
United States – Jordan Bilateral Free Trade Agreement 17-Dec-01
Turkey – Croatia Bilateral Free trade agreement 01-Jul-03
Three of the agreements originally came into force before the time period covered by the 
data set used (EU, EFTA and CACM). This means that the coefficients are based on late 
joiners and countries that left these agreements. However in each case the coefficient on 
the RTA dummy was also positive and significant in a similar estimation using the data 
set provided by Rose, which goes back as far as 1948 for many countries. In combination 
these results seemed to justify including these agreements as effective RTAs. 
The overall success rate for RTAs was 46%, with a certain amount of variation between 
types of agreement and date of entry etc. As shown in Figure 2, customs unions were 23
more  likely  to  succeed  than  other  types  of  agreement,  with  2/3  of  these  agreements 
having  an  appreciable  effect  on  trade  between  members.  Free  Trade  Agreements 
followed  the  sample  mean,  but  Preferential  Arrangements,  which  do  not  necessarily 
amount to a complete liberalisation of bilateral flows, are less likely to be successful than 
those in the general sample, with only 1/3 measured as effective. Half of the agreements 
between the EU and a third country were found to be effective, and the same percentage 
of EFTA’s agreements with external countries appear to ‘work’ (bilateral agreements 
between the EU and EFTA and other countries account for 49 out of the 157 agreements 
that had come into force by 2005). By contrast, only a third of standalone agreements 
between single countries seem to increase trade flows between signatories.








% effective 0.67 0.46 0.33
Not Effective 2 59 8
Effective 4 51 4
Customs Unions FTAs Preferential Arrangements
On the whole, RTAs prior to 1980 seem to have been less successful than those in the 
following decades. The most successful period for RTAs was also the most prolific – the 
1990s - when nearly two-thirds of RTAs seem to have been effective. Only 23 percent of 
RTAs entering into force since 2000 were found to be effective in this analysis, although 
the primary reason for this may well be that many of these RTAs have entered into force 
too recently to have a measurable impact on trade flows.24









% effective 0.38 0.50 0.61 0.23
Not Effective 10 3 26 30
Effective 6 3 40 9
up to 1980 1980 - 1990 1990 - 2000 2000 onwards
Results Part II: Explaining the Pattern of Effective RTAs
In this section the aim is to explain the probability that an effective RTA is implemented 
between two countries (using the dependent variable ‘realRTA’ as defined above). The 
model aims to predict, for any given country pair, the probability that an RTA is both 
signed and effective, compared to the possibility of either having an ineffective RTA or 
none at all. Since the dependent variable is binary, it is not appropriate to use an ordinary 
linear model, and a logit estimation was carried out. This restricts the prediction based on 
the right hand side variables to between zero and one, which is then interpreted as a 
probability  that  the  dependent  variable  takes  the  value  one.  In  the  goodness  of  fit 
statistics a ‘predicted’ realRTA is one for which the predicted probability was greater 
than 0.5.
The hypothesis outlined earlier was that there is some threshold value below which the 
share  of  exports  to  a  partner  is  insufficient  to  justify  the  effort  of  implementing  an 25
effective RTA. In this case only the export share of the country with its exports less 
concentrated towards its partner should have a significant effect on the probability of 
realRTA formation. However in the first estimation no attempt was made to distinguish 
between countries in the trading relationship or their importance to each other:
Table 2: Predicting realRTAs
Dependent Variable = realRTA
Coefficient Std.Err. P>|z|
s12  0.5903 0.4495 0.189
s21 1.3597 0.5230 0.009
Dist -0.0001 0.0000 0
Contig 1.1346 0.1965 0 Number of obs    5356
comlang_off -0.3631 0.1458 0.013 LR chi2(7)      310.39
colony 0.7151 0.3524 0.042 Prob > chi2      0
comcol -1.8216 0.3520 0 Pseudo R2        0.0845
_cons -1.2159 0.0859 0 Log likelihood  -1681.51
Actual
Predicted realRTA=1 realRTA=0 Total
realRTA=1 20 7 80
realRTA=0 560 4769 5276
Total 580 4776 5356
Sensitivity Pr( +| D) 3.45%
Specificity Pr( -|~D) 99.85%
Positive predictive value Pr( D| +) 74.07%
Negative predictive value Pr(~D| -) 89.49%
Correctly classified 89.41%
In the first estimation s21 is positive and significant, as expected, but s12, though positive,
is insignificant at the 10 percent level. Hence there is already an indication that the shares 
of the different countries do not enter symmetrically into the model (since the order of 
countries in the data set is more or less random nothing specific can be deduced at this 
stage from the difference in the two coefficients). The sign and significance of s21 also 
provides evidence that export shares do have an important effect on the probability of a 
successfully implemented RTA.
The  performance  of  the  other  variables  is  mixed.  Distance  and  contiguity  have  the 
expected signs but a common official language appears to reduce the probability of a 
successful trade agreement, as does a common coloniser. In this specification it appears 26
that countries are more likely to implement agreements with countries that they have 
colonised, or been colonised by.
The explanatory power of the model is not high. Only 3.45 percent of realRTAs were 
correctly predicted by the model (20 out of 580), and the pseudo-R
2 was 0.085. However 
there is already interesting evidence to support the hypothesis that the success of RTAs is 
driven  by  the  export  interests  of  the  countries  involved.  In  the  next  specification,  a 
distinction was made between the minimum and maximum export shares of the countries 
involved, and these entered into the model as separate variables:
Table 3: Predicting realRTAs - 'min' and 'max' Export Shares
Dependent Variable = realRTA
Coefficient Std.Err. P>|z|
Mins 68.9663 7.2285 0
Maxs -0.2153 0.5264 0.683
Dist -0.0001 0.0000 0
Contig 0.1969 0.2417 0.415 Number of obs   5356
comlang_off -0.5314 0.1592 0.001 LR chi2(7)    441.75
colony 0.5205 0.3735 0.164 Prob > chi2    0
comcol -1.8670 0.3768 0 Pseudo R2     0.1203
_cons -1.4553 0.0912 0 Log likelihood -1615.83
Actual
Predicted realRTA=1 realRTA=0 Total
realRTA=1 54 26 80
realRTA=0 526 4750 5276
Total 580 4776 5356
Sensitivity Pr( +| D) 9.31%
Specificity Pr( -|~D) 99.46%
Positive predictive value Pr( D| +) 67.50%
Negative predictive value Pr(~D| -) 90.03%
Correctly classified 89.69%
The mins variable (which represents the lower of the two export shares) is positive and 
highly significant. The coefficient is much larger than that on the either of the export 
shares in  the previous estimation.  By contrast,  the  maxs  variable is  negative and not 
significant.  Together  these  results  provide  strong  evidence  to  support  the  hypothesis 
outlined above. They support  the view that even  if one country exports a very large 
proportion of its  goods to  another, an effective  RTA will  only emerge if the second 
country also sends a large share of its exports in the other direction. For example there 27
may be many small countries that are heavily dependent on their exports to the United 
States but which do not have an effectively implemented free trade agreement since the 
United States has no particular interest in their export market.
The coefficient on distance remains negative and significant as expected,
20 reflecting the 
fact that countries which are further away from each other are less likely to implement 
effective RTAs. The coefficients on the other variables are less convincing. Contiguity 
and a colonial link now appear to be insignificant, and common language and common 
coloniser are significant, but do not have the expected sign. It is difficult to think of a 
convincing economic explanation for these results. It is slightly worrying to see the signs 
of the coefficients switching like this between estimations, but reassuringly, the sign and 
significance of the coefficient on mins is robust to changes of specification, including 
dropping insignificant variables.
The predictive power of the model has improved, with 89.69 percent of relationships 
correctly classified (including pairs where the absence of an effective RTA was correctly 
predicted). The pseudo-R
2 has risen to 0.12, and 54 out of 580 realRTAs were correctly 
predicted (9.31%). 
In the third specification dummies are added to capture cases where the two countries are 
on  the  same  continent.  The  other  variables  are  retained  even  where  they  were  not 
significant in the previous estimation to see if there is any change in the results, and to 
minimise the possibility of omitted variable bias.
                                                
20 The coefficient on distance is small, reflecting the fact that distance, the magnitude of which is usually in 
the thousands, has a small marginal effect on the probability of realRTA formation.28
Table 4: Predicting realRTAs - Same Continent  Dummies
Dependent Variable = realRTA
Coefficient Std.Err. P>|z|
Mins 55.70552 7.517582 0
Maxs -0.61298 0.629829 0.33
Dist 0.000115 1.68E-05 0
Contig 0.37485 0.272098 0.168
comlang_off -0.2396 0.183956 0.193
Colony 0.656156 0.41903 0.117
Comcol -1.42613 0.38171 0
Africaboth 0.663216 0.345312 0.055
Americaboth 2.336071 0.221257 0 Number of obs   = 5356
Asiaboth 0.702179 0.292858 0.016 LR chi2(7)      = 966.96
Europeboth 3.616355 0.188399 0 Prob > chi2     = 0
Pacificboth 0.658307 1.107372 0.552 Pseudo R2       = 0.2632
_cons -4.0917 0.194709 0 Log likelihood = -1353.23
Actual
Predicted realRTA=1 realRTA=0 Total
realRTA=1 147 51 198
realRTA=0 433 4725 5158
Total 580 4776 5356
Sensitivity Pr( +| D) 25.34%
Specificity Pr( -|~D) 98.93%
Positive predictive value Pr( D| +) 74.24%
Negative predictive value Pr(~D| -) 91.61%
Correctly classified 90.96%
The key result, the positive and significant coefficient on mins, remains unchanged, and 
maxs  continues  to  be  insignificant.  In  addition,  three  of  the  continent  dummies  are 
positive  and significant at the 5% level. From  these results, it  appears  that countries 
which are both in Europe, the Americas, or Asia, are more likely to form effective RTAs 
with each other than pairs which are not both on these continents. The largest marginal 
effect is for countries in Europe, then America. The ‘Africaboth’ variable is significant at 
the  10%  level,  but  this  is  not  very  robust  to  changes  of  specification.  The  positive 
coefficient on the Asian dummy does not seem to be robust to changes of specification 
either, but the European and American pro-RTA effects are much less sensitive and tend 
to remain positive and significant (with the European coefficient remaining larger than 
the  American  one).  This  is  consistent  with  the  prediction  of  the  domino  theory  that 
liberalisation between certain countries will instigate regional waves of agreements.29
The descriptive dummies (e.g. for contiguity) perform badly again; here none of them 
have a significant coefficient of the expected sign. This time the coefficient on distance 
does not have the expected sign either. A possible explanation for this is that the use of 
continent dummies clouds the relationship with distance, since countries on the same 
continent are likely to be relatively close together.
21
The predictive power of the model has increased significantly. The pseudo R
2 is 0.26, 
compared to 0.12 in the previous model, and 25% of realRTAs were correctly predicted. 
Overall  91%  of  pairs  were  correctly  classified.  However  there  remains  a  lot  of 
unexplained variance in the dependent variable. Clearly many explanatory factors have 
been omitted from the model, and these are likely to include both economic and political 
factors.  Consideration  of  any  specific  agreement  leads  rapidly  to  the  view  that  most 
RTAs are result from a complex mix of political and economic motivations. For example 
the European Union, which is much broader in scope than a simple free trade agreement 
was motivated in part by a desire to stabilise the European continent in the wake of two 
world wars. These factors are difficult to capture in a simple econometric model, and no 
real attempt has been made to do so in this estimation.
In comparable literature the predictive power also tends to be fairly low. Magee (2004) 
manages to predict 50-55% of signed agreements correctly. Tenreyro et al (2003) attempt 
to model the determinants of currency unions, and obtain a pseudo R-squared of 0.56 
(their model includes 15 explanatory variables). Although Baier and Bergstrand manage 
to correctly predict 85% of signed RTAs, their sample includes only 54 countries and 
1431 pairings, in comparison to the 5356 observations in this sample.
                                                
21 Another factor in this is that there are a couple of unusual effective agreements covering a very large 
dispersion  of  countries.  The  GSTP  and  PTN  preferential  arrangements  both  cover  a  large  number  of 
developing countries, some of which are very far away from each other. The results of the estimation are 
quite sensitive to their inclusion since, although they are only two agreements, they cover a large number of 
bilateral relationships. If these two agreements are left out of the realRTA variable then distance becomes 
negative  and  significant  again.  There  is  no  reasonable  justification  for  leaving  these  RTAs  out  of  the 
realRTA coefficient, but this example serves to illustrate the important point that multi-member agreements 
do have a large influence on the results of these estimations.30
Conclusions
In this dissertation I have tried to shed new light onto some of the questions underlying 
the debate about regional trade agreements. Most importantly I have focussed on the 
question of which types of countries are most likely to implement agreements with each 
other. However, in order to generate meaningful results it was necessary to isolate and 
consider only those agreements which genuinely increase trade flows between members. 
This in itself was a complex and time-consuming process.
In the first part of the research a gravity model was used to assess the effectiveness of all 
RTAs  for  which  information  on  date  of  entry  was  readily  available,  a  total  of  158 
agreements. For each agreement the effectiveness was tested using a dummy variable 
taking the value 1 between member countries in the years after the agreement came into 
force.  If  the  dummy  had  a  positive  and  significant  coefficient  the  agreement  was 
considered to be effective. The results revealed that less than half of signed RTAs were 
effective. Agreements prior to 1980 were less likely to be successful than those signed in 
the 1980s and 1990s, and customs unions were more likely to be effective than other 
types of agreement. Although the 5% significance level was used to judge significance, 
of  the  effective  agreements  the  majority  (45  out  of  55)  had  coefficients  that  were 
significant at the 1% level (a further six were significant at the 2 percent level). This 
indicates a quite clear distinction between those that work, and those that don’t. Overall, 
the  results  were  consistent  with  the  idea  that  many  signed  RTAs  are  not  effective, 
justifying the effort to measure their effectiveness in the first place.
The  second  part  of  this  study  shows  that  the  formation  of  effective  RTAs  between 
countries is an endogenous outcome. Mercantile interest in access to export markets is a 
highly significant determinant of this, as measured by the share of exports to a particular 
partner  in  total  exports  from  a  particular  country.  However  countries  with  a 
disproportionate  interest  in  access  to  their  trade  partner’s  market  (compared  to  their 
partner’s  interest  in  them)  appear  not  to  have  any  influence  on  the  probability  of  a 
successful RTA emerging with this partner. In other words dominant partners (or hubs
representing important export markets to many of their trading partners) can pick and 
choose  who  to  implement  (effective)  agreements  with,  whereas  smaller  countries,  or
spokes, may not always be able to instigate such an arrangement, either with a hub, or 
another spoke. This implies that the pattern of regional trade agreements that emerges 31
might not always be in the interests of the smaller trading nations. Although the results 
are somewhat preliminary, they do suggest the value of exploring this avenue further, 
possibly using an instrumental variable approach to deal with the endogeneity problem.
Another interesting result was seen after the inclusion of dummy variables for pairs of 
countries on the same continent. This revealed that two countries both being on certain 
continents  significantly  increased  their  chances  of  signing  an  effective  RTA, 
independently of their importance to each other as trading partners. The continent for 
which this effect was the most pronounced was Europe. This is consistent with Baldwin’s 
domino theory, in which waves of agreements will be signed in the wake of the first few 
important agreements in a region, as countries that are left out seek to get access to the 
expanding export markets covered by the earlier liberalisation. It is less consistent with 
any  explanation  based  purely  on  the  regional  proximity  of  countries  wishing  to 
participate in agreements since in this view any dummy capturing a common continent 
would be expected to raise the likelihood of effective agreement formation. The results of 
these estimations suggest that dominoes are falling in Europe and America, and the first 
may be beginning to fall in Asia, but not yet in the Pacific region or Africa.
Another way to look at the continent dummies is that they have picked up some of the 
complexities  behind  the  decision  to  create  trade  agreements.  Whereas  the  model 
effectively  treated  all  decisions  about  whether  to  join  regional  trade  agreements  as 
bilateral ones, in regions where extensive integration has already taken place this is not 
necessarily  realistic.  If  a  large  regional  trading  block  has  already  been  formed,  then 
countries outside of that block might see the block, rather than the set of smaller export 
markets within it, as the unit with which they wish to form an agreement (in the case of 
customs unions this would be the only possibility). In such regions the probability of 
effective agreements would be raised.
There remains considerable scope for research in this field, but this dissertation has begun 
to explore some of the issues behind the pattern of those regional trade agreements which 
genuinely play a role in shaping trade flows around the world. It is only by obtaining an 
understanding of such forces that it will be possible to make inferences about how the 
current proliferation of agreements is likely to affect the world trading system and its 
members.32
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Appendices
Appendix 1: Derivation of the Gravity Model
22
Expenditure share identity for a single variety:
; d od od od E share x p 
Where:
xod = the quantity of bilateral exports of a single variety from nation o to nation d
pod = the price of the good inside country d
Ed = the destination nation’s nominal expenditure
shareod = (by definition) the good’s share of expenditure in nation d  
The expenditure share depends on relative prices and income levels. Using the CES demand 
function (assuming that all goods are traded):

















k kd k d d d
d
od





pod/Pd = the relative price
Pd = nation-d’s CES price index
m = the number of nations from which nation-d buys things
 = the elasticity of substitution among all varieties 
nk = the number of varieties exported from nation k. 
 = denominator of the CES demand function. 
Assuming full pass-through
23 all trade costs are passed on to the consumer:
od o od p p  
                                                
22 This derivation closely follows Baldwin (2005).
23 Consistent with Dixit-Stiglitz monopolistic competition and perfect competition.35
Where:
 po = producer price of nation-o exports
od = all trade costs 
Multiply the expenditure share function by the number of varieties nation o has to offer (no) to get 













Nation-o’s expenditure must equal the total value of its output (general equilibrium condition 
ignoring current account imbalances). To make this happen, o’s producer prices must adjust to 
ensure that:
 
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Finally, substitute the above into the expression for the volume of trade:
t d t o
t d t o
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Appendix 2: Current RTAs and Membership
AFTA ASEAN Free Trade Area Brunei Darussalam Cambodia Indonesia Laos 
Malaysia Myanmar Philippines Singapore Thailand 
Vietnam
ASEAN Association of South East Asian 
Nations
Brunei Darussalam Cambodia Indonesia Laos 
Malaysia Myanmar Philippines Singapore Thailand 
Vietnam
BAFTA Baltic Free-Trade Area Estonia Latvia Lithuania
BANGKOK Bangkok Agreement Bangladesh China India Republic of Korea Laos Sri 
Lanka
CAN Andean Community Bolivia Colombia Ecuador Peru Venezuela
CARICOM Caribbean Community and 
Common Market
Antigua & Barbuda Bahamas Barbados Belize 
Dominica Grenada Guyana Haiti Jamaica 
Monserrat Trinidad & Tobago St. Kitts & Nevis St. 
Lucia St. Vincent & the Grenadines Surinam
CACM Central American Common 
Market
Costa Rica El Salvador Guatemala Honduras 
Nicaragua
CEFTA Central European Free Trade 
Agreement
Bulgaria Croatia  Romania
CEMAC Economic and Monetary 
Community of Central Africa
Cameroon Central African Republic Chad Congo 
Equatorial Guinea Gabon
CER Closer Trade Relations Trade 
Agreement
Australia New Zealand
CIS Commonwealth of Independent 
States
Azerbaijan Armenia Belarus Georgia Moldova 
Kazakhstan Russian Federation Ukraine Uzbekistan 
Tajikistan Kyrgyz Republic
COMESA Common Market for Eastern 
and Southern Africa
Angola Burundi Comoros Democratic Republic of 
Congo Djibouti Egypt Eritrea Ethiopia Kenya 
Madagascar Malawi Mauritius Namibia Rwanda 
Seychelles  Sudan Swaziland Uganda Zambia 
Zimbabwe
EAC East African Community Kenya Tanzania Uganda
EAEC Eurasian Economic Community Belarus Kazakhstan  Kyrgyz Republic Russian 
Federation Tajikistan
EC European Communities Austria Belgium Cyprus Czech Republic Denmark 
Estonia Finland France Germany Greece Hungary 
Ireland Italy Latvia Lithuania Luxembourg Malta 
Poland Portugal Slovak Republic Slovenia Spain 
Sweden The Netherlands United Kingdom
ECO Economic Cooperation 
Organization
Afghanistan Azerbaijan Iran Kazakhstan Kyrgyz 
Republic Pakistan Tajikistan Turkey Turkmenistan 
Uzbekistan
EEA European Economic Area EC Iceland Liechtenstein Norway37
EFTA European Free Trade 
Association
Iceland Liechtenstein Norway Switzerland
GCC Gulf Cooperation Council Bahrain Kuwait Oman Qatar Saudi Arabia United 
Arab Emirates
GSTP General System of Trade 
Preferences among Developing 
Countries
Algeria Argentina Bangladesh Benin Bolivia Brazil 
Cameroon Chile Colombia Cuba Democratic 
People's Republic of Korea Ecuador Egypt Ghana 
Guinea Guyana India Indonesia Islamic Republic of 
Iran Iraq Libya Malaysia Mexico Morocco 
Mozambique Myanmar Nicaragua
LAIA Latin American Integration 
Association
Argentina Bolivia Brazil Chile Colombia Cuba 
Ecuador Mexico Paraguay Peru Uruguay Venezuela
MERCOSUR Southern Common Market Argentina Brazil Paraguay Uruguay
MSG Melanesian Spearhead Group Fiji Papua New Guinea Solomon Islands  Vanuatu
NAFTA North American Free Trade 
Agreement
Canada Mexico United States
OCT Overseas Countries and 
Territories
Greenland New Caledonia French Polynesia French 
Southern and Antarctic Territories Wallis and 
Futuna Islands Mayotte Saint Pierre and Miquelon 
Aruba Netherlands Antilles Anguilla Cayman 
Islands Falkland Islands South Georgia and South 
Sandwich Islands Mon
PATCRA Agreement on Trade and 
Commercial Relations between 
the Goverment of Australia and 
the Government  of Papua New 
Guinea
Australia, Papua New Guinea
PTN Protocol relating to Trade 
Negotiations among Developing 
Countries
Bangladesh Brazil Chile Egypt Israel Mexico 
Pakistan Paraguay Peru Philippines Republic of 
Korea Romania Tunisia Turkey Uruguay 
Yugoslavia
SADC Southern African Development 
Community
Angola Botswana Lesotho Malawi Mauritius 
Mozambique Namibia South Africa Swaziland 
Tanzania Zambia Zimbabwe
SAPTA South Asian Preferential Trade 
Arrangement
Bangladesh Bhutan India Maldives Nepal Pakistan 
Sri Lanka
SPARTECA South Pacific Regional Trade 
and Economic Cooperation 
Agreement
Australia New Zealand Cook Islands Fiji Kiribati 
Marshall Islands Micronesia Nauru Niue Papua 
New Guinea Solomon Islands Tonga Tuvalu 
Vanuatu Western Samoa
TRIPARTITE Tripartite Agreement Egypt India Yugoslavia
UEMOA
WAEMU
West African Economic and 
Monetary Union
Benin Burkina Faso Côte d'Ivoire Guinea Bissau 
Mali Niger Senegal Togo
Source: WTO38
Appendix 3: Results of the Pooled and Panel Gravity Models
POOLED PANEL with Country Pair Fixed Effects and 
Year Dummies
R-squared     =  0.6855 R-squared     =  0.9174
Adj R-squared =  0.6852 Adj R-squared =  0.9108
Root MSE      =  1.9751 Root MSE      =  1.0515
Regression with robust standard errors Regression with robust standard errors                 
Number of obs =  139825 Number of obs =  139825
ltrade Coefficient ltrade Coefficient
_cons -20.996 ** _cons -56.331 **
lgdp1 0.937 ** lgdp1 0.870 **
lgdp2 0.928 ** lgdp2 0.866 **
lpop1 0.027 ** lpop1 0.980 **
lpop2 0.051 ** lpop2 0.986 **
ldist -1.145 **
pairEU58 -0.067 ** pairEU58 0.555 **
pairEFTA59 1.508 ** pairEFTA59 0.229 **
pairCACM60 2.530 ** pairCACM60 (dropped) **
pairCARICOM72 3.354 ** pairCARICOM72 0.398 **
pairEUOCTs70 0.724 ** pairEUOCTs70 -0.668
pairMERCUSOR94 0.464 ** pairMERCUSOR94 0.267 **
pairNAFTA93 0.375 ** pairNAFTA93 0.770 **
pairCOMESA94 -0.495 ** pairCOMESA94 0.247
pairEAEC96 1.053 ** pairEAEC96 0.022
pairSAPTA95 -0.223 pairSAPTA95 -0.173
pairCIS94 1.930 ** pairCIS94 (dropped) **
pairMSG92 0.124 pairMSG92 0.921 **
pairCER82 -0.803 ** pairCER82 0.400 **
pairCAN87 0.478 ** pairCAN87 0.843 **
pairTRIPARTITE67 0.562 ** pairTRIPARTITE67 -2.010 **
pairPTN72 -0.383 ** pairPTN72 0.914 **
pairPATCRA76 -0.060 pairPATCRA76 -0.173
pairBANKOK75 -0.123 pairBANKOK75 1.910 **
pairSPARTECA80 3.288 ** pairSPARTECA80 -0.062
pairLAIA80 0.808 ** pairLAIA80 -0.067
pairGSTP88 -0.631 ** pairGSTP88 0.776 **
pairCEMAC98 -0.305 pairCEMAC98 -0.913 **
pairCEFTA92 0.424 ** pairCEFTA92 0.443 **
pairWAEMU99 1.178 ** pairWAEMU99 -0.010
pairEAC99 -4.230 ** pairEAC99 (dropped) **
pairSADC99 1.012 ** pairSADC99 -0.032
pairEUSWISS72 -0.235 ** pairEUSWISS72 0.214 **
pairEUICELAND72 0.639 ** pairEUICELAND72 0.122 **
pairEUNORWAY72 0.114 ** pairEUNORWAY72 0.300 **
pairEUALG75 -0.713 ** pairEUALG75 -0.313 **
pairEUSYR76 -0.171 ** pairEUSYR76 -0.115
pairEUROM92 -0.445 ** pairEUROM92 1.288 **
pairEUBULG92 -0.094 pairEUBULG92 0.609 **
pairEUTURK95 -0.301 ** pairEUTURK95 0.941 **
pairEUTUN97 -0.332 ** pairEUTUN97 0.051
pairEUSTHA99 1.066 ** pairEUSTHA99 0.036
pairEUMOR99 -0.265 ** pairEUMOR99 -0.07539
pairEUISR99 0.135 pairEUISR99 -0.408 **
pairEUMEX99 -0.550 ** pairEUMEX99 0.237 **
pairEUMAC00 -0.847 ** pairEUMAC00 0.126
pairEUCRO01 -1.165 ** pairEUCRO01 0.115
pairEUJOR01 -0.940 ** pairEUJOR01 0.152
pairEUCHL02 0.850 ** pairEUCHL02 0.252
pairEULEB02 -1.125 ** pairEULEB02 -0.139 **
pairEFTATURK91 -0.943 ** pairEFTATURK91 0.573 **
pairEFTAISRA92 0.058 pairEFTAISRA92 -0.582 **
pairEFTAROM92 -0.923 ** pairEFTAROM92 0.923 **
pairEFTABULG92 -0.817 ** pairEFTABULG92 0.773 **
pairEFTAMOR98 -1.122 ** pairEFTAMOR98 0.022
pairEFTAMAC99 -1.454 ** pairEFTAMAC99 0.266
pairEFTAMEX00 -1.282 ** pairEFTAMEX00 0.220
pairEFTAJOR01 -3.268 ** pairEFTAJOR01 -0.398
pairEFTACRO01 -1.386 ** pairEFTACRO01 0.009
pairEFTASNG02 1.815 ** pairEFTASNG02 -0.397 **
pairUSISRAEL84 1.492 ** pairUSISRAEL84 0.042
pairARMRUS92 -0.028 pairARMRUS92 (dropped) **
pairKRYGRUS92 1.097 ** pairKRYGRUS92 (dropped) **
pairGEORUS93 -0.543 ** pairGEORUS93 (dropped) **
pairROMMOLD94 2.039 ** pairROMMOLD94 0.117 **
pairKYRGARM95 -3.513 ** pairKYRGARM95 (dropped) **
pairKYRGKAZAK95 0.016 pairKYRGKAZAK95 0.248 **
pairARMMOLD95 -0.817 ** pairARMMOLD95 (dropped) **
pairGEORUKR95 -0.332 ** pairGEORUKR95 (dropped) **
pairARMTURKM95 3.571 ** pairARMTURKM95 (dropped) **
pairGEORGAZER95 0.880 ** pairGEORGAZER95 (dropped) **
pairKYRGMOL96 0.653 pairKYRGMOL96 0.237
pairARMUKR96 -0.635 ** pairARMUKR96 (dropped) **
pairCANISRAE96 0.662 ** pairCANISRAE96 -0.122
pairISRATURK96 0.185 pairISRATURK96 0.873 **
pairCANCHILE96 1.082 ** pairCANCHILE96 0.637 **
pairKRYGUKR97 0.429 ** pairKRYGUKR97 -0.146
pairROMTURK97 -0.087 pairROMTURK97 0.543 **
pairGEORGARM97 -0.126 pairGEORGARM97 -0.585 **
pairBULTUR98 0.483 ** pairBULTUR98 0.465 **
pairGEOKAZ98 -0.553 pairGEOKAZ98 0.437
pairCHIMEX98 1.705 ** pairCHIMEX98 0.039
pairMEXISR99 -0.123 ** pairMEXISR99 0.097
pairBULMAC99 0.967 ** pairBULMAC99 -0.228 **
pairGEOTUM99 3.550 ** pairGEOTUM99 -0.325
pairTURMAC99 -0.542 ** pairTURMAC99 -0.243
pairNZLSNG01 2.761 ** pairNZLSNG01 -0.862 **
pairINDSRI01 1.324 ** pairINDSRI01 0.302
pairUSAJOR01 0.581 ** pairUSAJOR01 0.987 **
pairARMKAZ01 -2.428 ** pairARMKAZ01 -0.695 **
pairBULISR01 -0.434 ** pairBULISR01 0.029
pairCHLCTR01 1.850 ** pairCHLCTR01 1.299 **
pairCHLELS01 0.441 pairCHLELS01 1.188 **
pairALBMAC01 -0.628 ** pairALBMAC01 -0.935 **
pairJAPSNG02 1.788 ** pairJAPSNG02 -0.742 **
pairCROALB02 -1.067 ** pairCROALB02 -0.280 **
pairCROTUR02 -1.495 ** pairCROTUR02 0.336 **
pairAUSSNG02 2.682 ** pairAUSSNG02 -0.524 **40
pairALBBUL02 -1.724 ** pairALBBUL02 -0.021
pairEUMAL70 0.993 ** pairEUMAL70 0.280 **
pairEUCYP72 0.652 ** pairEUCYP72 -0.200 **
pairEUEGY76 -0.119 pairEUEGY76 0.145
pairEUCZH91 -0.462 ** pairEUCZH91 0.267 **
pairEUHUN91 -0.200 ** pairEUHUN91 0.938 **
pairEUPOL91 -0.635 ** pairEUPOL91 0.804 **
pairEUSLO91 -0.594 ** pairEUSLO91 (dropped) **
pairEUEST94 0.189 ** pairEUEST94 (dropped) **
pairEULAT94 -0.240 ** pairEULAT94 0.750 **
pairEULIT94 -0.161 ** pairEULIT94 0.684 **
pairEUSLV96 -0.389 ** pairEUSLV96 0.235 **
pairEFTACZE91 -0.573 ** pairEFTACZE91 (dropped) **
pairEFTASLO91 -0.966 ** pairEFTASLO91 -0.342 **
pairEFTAHUN92 -0.666 ** pairEFTAHUN92 0.224 **
pairEFTAPOL92 -0.620 ** pairEFTAPOL92 0.379 **
pairEFTASLV94 -0.789 ** pairEFTASLV94 0.499 **
pairEFTAEST95 0.795 ** pairEFTAEST95 0.657 **
pairEFTALAT95 0.195 pairEFTALAT95 1.161 **
pairEFTALIT95 0.173 pairEFTALIT95 0.668 **
pairCHIBOL94 1.629 ** pairCHIBOL94 -0.484 **
pairESTHUN97 1.051 ** pairESTHUN97 1.218 **
pairESTSLO96 -0.088 pairESTSLO96 1.181 **
pairESTTUR97 -0.729 ** pairESTTUR97 -0.388
pairESTUKR95 1.872 ** pairESTUKR95 (dropped) **
pairHONPAN72 2.398 ** pairHONPAN72 0.222 **
pairHUNISR97 -0.187 ** pairHUNISR97 0.142
pairHUNLAT99 -0.343 ** pairHUNLAT99 0.222 **
pairHUNLIT99 -0.057 pairHUNLIT99 -0.074
pairHUNTUR97 -0.620 ** pairHUNTUR97 0.593 **
pairINDNEP90 0.666 ** pairINDNEP90 0.526
pairISRPOL97 -1.046 ** pairISRPOL97 0.462
pairISRSLO96 -1.158 ** pairISRSLO96 -0.313 **
pairLATPOL98 -0.357 ** pairLATPOL98 0.543 **
pairLATSLO96 0.489 ** pairLATSLO96 0.905 **
pairLATSLV95 0.015 pairLATSLV95 1.742 **
pairLATTUR99 -2.025 ** pairLATTUR99 -0.227
pairLITPOL96 0.197 ** pairLITPOL96 0.299 **
pairLITSLO96 -0.188 ** pairLITSLO96 -0.176 **
pairLITSLV96 -0.308 ** pairLITSLV96 0.321 **
pairLITTUR96 -0.174 pairLITTUR96 0.692 **
pairMEXBOL94 -0.236 ** pairMEXBOL94 0.382
pairMEXCTR94 0.594 ** pairMEXCTR94 0.679 **
pairMEXNIC97 0.636 ** pairMEXNIC97 -0.156
pairPOLTUR99 -0.927 ** pairPOLTUR99 0.684 **
pairSLOTUR97 -0.812 ** pairSLOTUR97 0.522 **
pairSLVMAC95 2.784 ** pairSLVMAC95 -0.470 **
pairSLVTUR99 -0.365 ** pairSLVTUR99 0.649 **
pairBAFTA93 2.805 ** pairBAFTA93 (dropped) **
pairMEXCOLVEN94 -0.286 ** pairMEXCOLVEN94 0.554 **
pairMERCHI99 0.652 ** pairMERCHI99 -0.234 **
pairCHICA01 -0.676 ** pairCHICA01 (dropped) **
pairMEXTN00 -0.538 ** pairMEXTN00 (dropped) **
** shows significant at the 5% level, ‘effective’ agreements highlighted41
Appendix 4: Results of Gravity Estimations Split by Period
RTAs Entering into Force 1950-1970
R-squared     =  0.9394
Adj R-squared =  0.9290
Root MSE      =  .89314





pairEU58 0.184 0.001 0.202




RTAs Entering into Force 1970-1975
R-squared     =  0.9306
Adj R-squared =  0.9219
Root MSE      =  .95732






pairEUMAL70 0.342 0 0.407
pairCARIC~72 0.076 0.24







RTAs Entering into Force 1975-1980
R-squared     =  0.9270
Adj R-squared =  0.9188
Root MSE      =  .99259









pairEUEGY76 0.818 0 1.266
_cons -35.228 0
RTAs Entering into Force 1980-1985
R-squared     =  0.9286
Adj R-squared =  0.9210
Root MSE      =  .98386







pairCER82 0.218 0.045 0.244
pairUSISR~84 0.031 0.615
_cons -38.480 0
RTAs Entering into Force 1985-1990
R-squared     =  0.9336
Adj R-squared =  0.9253
Root MSE      =  .95093





pairCAN87 0.206 0.018 0.229




RTAs Entering into Force 1990-1995
R-squared     =  0.9389
Adj R-squared =  0.9306
Root MSE      =  .91231







pairEUHUN91 0.770 0 1.160
pairEUPOL91 0.741 0 1.09843




pairCEFTA92 0.346 0 0.414
pairEUROM92 1.039 0 1.828
pairEUBULG92 0.464 0 0.590
pairEFTAI~92 -0.291 0
pairEFTAR~92 0.757 0 1.132





pairEFTAH~92 0.249 0 0.282
pairEFTAP~92 0.280 0.018 0.324
pairNAFTA93 0.497 0 0.644
pairGEORUS93 (dropped)
pairBAFTA93 (dropped)
pairMERCU~94 0.222 0 0.249
pairCOMESA94 0.130 0.443
pairCIS94 (dropped)
pairROMMO~94 0.120 0 0.127
pairFAROE~94 (dropped)
pairEUEST94 (dropped)
pairEULAT94 0.694 0 1.002
pairEULIT94 0.621 0 0.861




pairMEXCTR94 0.514 0.025 0.673
pairMOLROM94 (dropped)
pairMEXCO~94 0.643 0 0.902
_cons -58.544 0
RTAs Entering into Force 1995-2000
R-squared     =  0.9463
Adj R-squared =  0.9390
Root MSE      =  .86276













pairEFTAE~95 0.681 0 0.975
pairEFTALA~5 1.180 0 2.253
pairEFTALI~5 0.691 0.016 0.996
pairESTUKR95 (dropped)







pairISRAT~96 0.916 0 1.499
pairCANCH~96 0.105 0.011 0.111
pairEUSLV96 0.194 0 0.214
pairESTSLO96 1.209 0 2.350
pairISRSLO96 -0.290 0
pairLATSLO96 0.951 0 1.589
pairLITPOL96 0.388 0 0.474
pairLITSLO96 -0.112 0.234
pairLITSLV96 0.378 0.007 0.459
pairLITTUR96 0.758 0.014 1.133
pairEUTUN97 -0.105 0.12
pairKRYGUK~7 -0.256 0.057




pairESTHUN97 1.282 0 2.603
pairESTTUR97 -0.351 0.17
pairHUNISR97 0.147 0.095
pairHUNTUR97 0.628 0 0.873
pairISRPOL97 0.525 0.138
pairMEXNIC97 0.193 0.231
pairSLOTUR97 0.528 0.038 0.695
pairCEMAC98 -0.435 0.297
pairEFTAM~98 -0.083 0.584
pairBULTUR98 0.452 0 0.572
pairGEOKAZ98 0.373 0.398
pairCHIMEX98 0.701 0.001 1.015
pairFARPOL98 (dropped)




pairEUSTHA99 0.156 0 0.169
pairEUMOR99 -0.037 0.426
pairEUISR99 -0.222 0
pairEUMEX99 0.205 0 0.228
pairEFTAM~99 0.220 0.242




pairHUNLAT99 0.295 0 0.343
pairHUNLIT99 0.001 0.994
pairLATTUR99 -0.186 0.642
pairPOLTUR99 0.649 0.001 0.914
pairSLVTUR99 0.618 0 0.856
pairMERCHI99 -0.178 0.013
_cons -43.883 0
RTAs Entering into Force 2000 onwards
R-squared     =  0.9535
Adj R-squared =  0.9457
Root MSE      =  .81827














pairINDSRI01 0.519 0 0.680


















Appendix 5: Residuals Plotted for Gravity Models
It is informative to examine the pattern of residuals when ordered in certain ways. The 
residuals shown here are from regressions including the full time period and all RTA 
dummies (for the purposes of brevity the residuals from the individual shorter-period 
estimations actually used to generate the realRTA series are not all displayed).
A) Evidence of Heteroskedasticity
Pooled Model:
In the graph below the residuals from the pooled model are ordered by the product of the 
logs of the GDPs of the countries (for the year of the observation). There is a clear wedge 
shape, indicating that the variance of the residuals is not independent of the explanatory 
variables (although they enter the specification additively, rather than multiplicatively). 
This illustrates why it was necessary to take into account heteroskedasticity using robust 
standard errors.
Final Specification using Fixed Effects:
The same plot is shown for the residuals of the estimation in which country pair fixed 
effects were added. Again, the variance of the errors is negatively related to the product 48
of  the  logs  of  the  GDPs  of  the  country  pair.  This  is  consistent  with  the  common 
observation that the gravity model is a better predictor of trade flows between developed, 
than developing countries.
B) The Use of Country Pair Fixed Effects
In the next plot, the residuals from the pooled model are plotted again, but this time the 
horizontal axis plots the coefficients on the fixed effects of each country pair. To the left-
hand side are those pairs where the fixed effect was negative, in other words allowing the 
intercept to vary by country pair reveals that these pairs have a consistently less strong 
trading relationship than what would be predicted by the model. As you would expect, 
these country pairs have more negative residuals in the original pooled estimation than 
the others, and there is an obvious upward sloping shape to the cloud of points. This 
simply highlights the importance of using the country pair fixed effects, since there is 
obviously a great deal of variation in the mean of the residuals by country pair.49
Once  the  fixed  effects  are  added  into  the  specification  this  problem  is  rectified  by 
introducing differences in intercepts between country pairs: